Abstract. The authors explore the processes by which British corporate retailers are maintaining their predominance in food provision in the 1990s. Taking the 'new retailing geography' literature as a context, they first outline the key features (spatial, sectoral, and supply related) of retailers' dynamic competitive space. They then examine the regulatory mechanisms used to influence policy development. The authors begin to address the ways in which combinations of regulatory and consumer culture influence the uneven development and maintenance of corporate retailing and food provision in the United Kingdom, focusing specifically on retailers' definitions and strategies associated with the provision of food quality.
Introduction: the uneven development of retailing and the new retail geography
The 1990s have witnessed intense corporate-retailer competition and the maintenance of a small group of retailers dominating the British market. At the same time, however, national public and government concerns about the quality of food and its provision have also intensified. The growing corporate power of retailers in the provision of food, together with the decreasing public confidence in food products, provides a major conundrum for government. How can the state best regulate food provision given its priorities for continuing to 'deregulate' the economy but encouraging the 'health of the nation'? How are consumers best represented through state, market, or interest-group activities? These are broad questions which currently lie at the heart of British policy concerning food. One important consequence is that the maintenance of corporate retailers' market power is increasingly dependent upon their social and political actions both towards state agencies and towards consumers. It is through these actions that market 'spaces' can be kept open and legitimated.
In this paper we explore the current processes by which British corporate retailers are maintaining their predominance in food provision despite the intensity of competition, threats to their legitimacy by the rise of 'more careful' forms of food consumption, and the multifarious development of regulation which could threaten their 'room for manoeuvre'. The paper falls into three parts. First, by developing some of the arguments in the literature associated with 'the new retail geography' we outline the main features of retailers' competitive space: that is, the ways in which economic competition is created and played out within different regulatory parameters. Second, we focus on the mechanisms by which corporate retailers develop regulatory relationships with government, given their increasing need to influence both the formation and the implementation of regulation so as to maintain competitive space. This involves the development of microcorporatist relationships between government and retailers. In the third part of the paper we examine the content of these relationships, particularly concerning the ways in which retailers convey and construct what are seen by government officials, inter alia, to be legitimate conceptions both of consumer interest and of food quality. These legitimate conceptions are, in the current phase, 'up for grabs', and thus need to be continuously constructed by corporate retailers through their innovative strategies and relationships with government. The evidence analysed demonstrates how corporate retailers attempt to construct and occupy legitimate conceptions of consumer interest and food quality during a period when both are coming under closer scrutiny. Under these highly dynamic conditions it is important to examine the links between consumer culture and regulatory culture, and how the particular conflation of these affords a conducive terrain upon which retailers can project their public as well as private responsibilities.
in the shaping of competitive spaces which 'prize open' new territories and terrains of exchange and profit making. In the third part of the paper we will focus specifically on how retail strategies are attempts to achieve this, by the promotion and regulation of notions of food quality and consumer representation both to consumers and, of particular importance, in dealing with national and EU government agencies. We will argue that reinforcing the tendencies of intense competition are food-quality concerns, particularly the development of legitimate knowledges of what constitutes good food. These become important inputs into the maintenance of retailers' competitive space. This is, moreover, far removed from strictly economic phenomena. Rather, it has to be based on the cultural and social constructions of food commodities themselves which in turn create competitive economic conditions (see Allaire and Boyer, 1995) .
It is worth first, however, outlining more specifically what is meant by the making of retail competitive space (see figure 1 ). This is important in that it demonstrates two conceptual points which are relevant when considering the evolution and maintenance of corporate retailing in the United Kingdom. First, a focus in this direction begins to go beyond the rather dichotomous assumptions in the literature concerning either the role of retailers as private operators in the market place per se, or the role of the state and regulation as a separate entity. Although their origins and objectives often stem from quite different quarters, we have to recognise-taking what Clark (1992) calls a 'real regulation' stance-that it is how both come together in particular arenas, how regulatory authority is constructed, which is analytically important in understanding retail development. This needs to incorporate notions concerning the corporate governance of 'the firm' (see Weber, 1996) , and the interrelated sets of linkages between firms and between firms and state agencies. This provides a focus upon how regulatory change and contestation and new competitive conditions occur out of the hybridisation of market and state power. In this sense, the notion of 'competitive space' indicates the dynamic outputs of this hybridised regulatory activity.
Second, once one accepts these points and places regulation as a central and active context in which the space for private capital and the rules and signals of exchange are forged, one begins to appreciate that this can only lead to a dynamic process of uneven development. The survival of one or more retail firms usually means the retrogression of others. Market rules, continually developed and shaped, hold distinct individual costs and benefits for retailers and consumers. Hence it is not just the innovative, economically rational, activity 'of the firm' which generates its potential dominance in the market place. Rather, it is the way in which it interacts and interfaces with other firms, consumers, and regulatory bodies over time and space; forging different regulatory alliances which begin to recreate the legitimate conditions for the pursuance of its increasingly diverse activities. The reconstitution of regulation as a product both of 'state' and of 'market' relations, and the reality of uneven development as an outcome of these relations become, therefore, important reasons for pursuing the concept of 'the making of competitive space'. Figure 1 illustrates its key parameters. Many of these are expressed in the emerging literature concerning the 'new retail geography'. There are at least three key dimensions (spatial, intrasectoral, and supply based) . It is important to distinguish these dimensions because of the differing (and potentially somewhat chaotic) meanings which can be attributed to the notion of 'space'. In addition, our evidence suggests that in each of these dimensions the variable definitions and constructions of food quality become increasingly important.
Probably the most popularly documented dimension in the policy and scholarly literature concerns the actual spatial battles associated with the competitive siting of retail and warehouse outlets (the so-called 'store-wars', see Wrigley, 1994) . This is very much played out in relation to the changing nature of planning legislation and guidance, and has recently involved retailers collaborating under the auspices of the National Retail Planning Forum. This essentially local process of gaining and holding on to the literal end of competitive space provides a major dynamic in the provision of retail stores (Clark et al, 1997) , and the restructuring of consumption spaces more generally. There is now an expansive literature on the siting of retail stores, which has been partly stimulated by the role of applied geographical analysts in assisting retailers in developing ever more sensitive appreciations of the social geography and consumer profiles of particular towns and cities. The corporate retailers have traditionally targeted the higher-social-class areas, with the discounters following up with locations adjoining them or targeted at working-class areas. This competitive process has served to solidify the sociospatial polarisations to such a degree that some commentators have begun to identify 'food deserts'. These are areas bereft of superstore development and populated by ailing independent grocers forced to charge high prices to their low-income customers (see Dobson et al, 1994; IPPR, 1994; National Food Alliance, 1995) . The playing out of the store-wars battles, presided over by an often compliant planning system which has pragmatically attempted to negotiate planning-gain developments on their rights of acceptance of development, is serving, by the mid-1990s, to heighten the spatial disparities in food provision, leading to large and uneven consumption spaces with their own geographies of plenty and scarcity.
Moreover, this tendency is particularly noticeable in the British context. Britain (along with Germany and the Netherlands), has one of the most densely consolidated types of corporate retailing. In the United Kingdom there are 61 retail stores per 10 000 inhabitants (98 being the EU average) with the largest having an average of 8.7 employees per store. These stores have average turnovers of more than 730 000 ECUs, which is eight times higher than the average in Greece and Portugal and twice that of the overall European average (Tordjman, 1995, page 17) .
However, by the mid-1990s we should recognise that to focus upon the actual new siting of stores, and their effects for consumption, is only one side of this spatial dimension. Of increasing significance are the loyalty geographies of compliant consumers. As the Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD, 1996) has argued, from extensive consumer research, it is the issue of consumer loyalty and confidence which now becomes a major focus for retailers. Major innovations concerning the development of SMART cards, membership deals, local-event sponsorship, free transport and the possibilities of home deliveries, retail banking, and electronic communication are being tried and tested by the corporate retailers. These strategies represent their coming to terms with their ongoing need to regenerate their catchment loyalties in the spaces in which they are already situated. Here, the supply and quality of their delivery becomes of critical importance in maintaining their competitive space vis-a-vis their local competitors. This is illustrated by two quotations from interviews with senior retail staff:
Question: "So, ideally you would like to know the name of each customer?" Answer 1: "Yes that would be brilliant; but at least to give the customer the feeling that he or she is important to us. At the delicatessen counter, for instance, it's a question of making sure that the same feel applies. The two concepts that we try to focus upon in regard to the customer in our business: one is the sense of belonging-we want to create a sense of belonging amongst our customers. The second is-and nobody is doing it well yet-is creating a sense of excitement-the thing is, shopping is largely a boring occupation, and anything you can actually do to liven it up. I don't know whether you go and look at other parts of the world, at American retailing?" Answer 2: "Frankly, food manufacturing and food retailing in the UK is not characterised by people trying to poison their customers. I mean, we like to think that we can get quite close to our customers. We are in the business of trying to communicate really clearly to them. Because we are in a market where there is abundant competition, we sure as hell do our best to do it well because we desperately want to acquire and maintain loyal customers. We are not trying to rip people off. Our job is to find customers in a saturated market and sell them goods equivalent to the price of a small family car every two years. You have got to develop that level of loyalty." If the 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the growing physical and social presence of the corporate store in local urban spaces, the more recent period, although continuing this trend (Guy, 1997; Langston et al, 1995) , has supplemented it with a growing concern with harnessing catchments of consumers around particular value, quality, and loyalty criteria. Redeeming the sunk costs of site expansion (Guy, 1997; Wrigley, 1996) engages the retailers in the local duty to 'serve the consumer'; attempting to project an image and a reality of local customer service above and beyond their local competitors.
If, then, the local maintenance of competitive space as literally a spatial dimension becomes a major arena for corporate retail strategy and uneven development, so does that concerning supply. Power along supply chains, and the increasing dominance of retailers in negotiating quality control in contracts and agreements, becomes a major feature in maintaining competitive space-between themselves and with food producers and processors (see Doel, 1996; Hughes, 1996) .
Empirical work in Britain and the USA has identified these supply relationships (see Marion, 1995) , with the British system being generally viewed as more 'retailer led' (Doel, 1996; Hughes, 1996) . The growth of own-label brands, and the weaker market position of manufacturers compared with their US counterparts means that "The composite character of the manufacturer interface is one of dynamic complexity ... There is a widespread consensus that those own-label supply networks created by proactive retailers and characterised by intensive interaction are assuming progressively greater quantitative and strategic significance" (Doel, 1996, page 62) .
In the British case the evidence suggests that these relationships not only begin to empower the corporate retailers over their upstream suppliers, that is, constructing a supply-led form of competitive space (see figure 1 ), but also that the particular supply relationships developed provide a basis for creating intrasectoral competitive spaces between the big three retailers, the other corporates, the discounters, and the independent sector. As we shall see below, this is particularly associated with food-quality concerns in a period when the attribution of food-quality standards and identities becomes much more sensitised, both by retailers intent on enhancing their loyalty rating, and by 'careful' consumers and agencies concerned with the increasing risks and responsibilities of food supply and provision. The development of quality-supply management thus becomes highly innovative, with exclusive supplier relationships developed between producers, processors, and retailers (Duke, 1996) .
There is, therefore, considerable evidence developing of the multidimensional nature of the making of corporate retailers' competitive space, along at least three interrelated dimensions: intrasectoral, spatial, and supply based (figure 1). Retailers' strategies have to deal with these simultaneously over time and space. These parameters begin to set a more sensitive analytical context for studying the uneven development of retailing, and particularly how it is maintained under intensely competitive conditions. In this sense, it begins analytically to frame the social and political bases of the new competitive conditions in which retailers find themselves-not so much as highly successful individual firms, as sets of competitive firms in nested relationships with consumers and regulators.
Having briefly outlined this competitive terrain and demonstrated its multidimensional and malleable character, in what follows we will first trace some of the key sociopolitical mechanisms by which retailers seek to achieve their aims in this context through the development of microcorporatist forms of regulatory intermediation. Increasingly, these levels of intermediation have to be based on authoritative and legitimate conceptions of food quality. In the third part of the paper, therefore, using evidence collected from retailers, government officials, and other food agencies, we outline some of the ways in which retailers seek to promote what are seen as the legitimate conceptions of the consumer interest, through recourse to constructed notions of food quality. This will demonstrate that in the contemporary period these constructed conceptions of food quality are highly fluid, and that this fluidity helps to shape the competitive space of retailers.
Retailers and state regulation: the evolving mechanisms
In the United Kingdom the 1990s have witnessed not only the continued, if more vulnerable, growth in dominance of corporate retailing, but also an increasing requirement on the part of retailers to engage in different regulatory domains in order to defend and project their individual and collective competitive space. As we note above, probably the most obvious expression of this has continued to be in site expansion, the continuation of the local store wars, and its new insinuation into the hearts as well as the peripheries of towns and cities. It is one of the most significant, if silent, historical ironies that many of the heartlands of British 'market' towns, which have, until recently, continued to act as agricultural (productionist) centres for their rural hinterlands, have now become the progressive target for corporate retail expansion with the agricultural auction mart finally relinquishing its grip as a central locus.
However, it is in the boardrooms and civil servants offices and corridors rather than the high street where the growing influence of retailers begins to source the changes expressed at the local level, and to assist the continuance of regulation which provides the opportunities for the maintenance of retail-market power. In a set of earlier papers we have begun to outline some of the generalised policy and regulatory shifts which have developed in this regard (Marsden and Wrigley, 1995; . For instance, we have argued that the corporate retailers have (not coincidentally) benefited from the neoright shift of regulatory policy towards consumption rather than production; from the encouragement of 'exchange' through the development of new rights to consume. One consequence, and one which was to a certain extent unforeseen by the early privatising and deregulating administrations, was the growth of new forms of regulation which focused around consumption concerns. It has become apparent in the British context-not least with regard to the continuing and deepening beef crisisthat the regulation of consumption concerns tend to grow rather than diminish as the process of 'deregulation' occurs. This puts governments in difficult positions with regard to their public responsibilities and legitimacy as they typify what Beck (1996) calls "the organised irresponsibility of the modern state"; increasingly facing the difficult but not contradictory question of 'how should we regulate the deregulated economy?'
In more specific terms, the growth in the role of corporate retailers inside as well as outside government has been one expression of the developing private interest model of regulation, whereby significant former government functions are bestowed, for what is seen as more effective management, to private sector interests. New forms of 'private interest government' (see Grant, 1986; Jacek, 1986) have been developing in the British case both as a cause and as a consequence of the growth and maintenance of retail power. It is important to realise that such models do not deny the continuing role of government in food regulation. Rather, they change its shape. Following on from the tried and tested macrocorporatist and mesocorporatist forms of regulation, which have been so much a part of the postwar agricultural and food 'compromise 5 in Britain, the past decade has witnessed a significantly different policy regime. Whereas the traditional corporatist arrangements have tended to wither rather than be eradicated completely, we have seen the progressive development of new microcorporatist relationships developing, despite rather than because of the existence of established structures of mediation. This has meant that the nature of food regulation in Britain has become increasingly dense, just at a time when the philosophy of deregulation should be gaining ground. Established Ministry committees, such as the Food Advisory Committee, have remained a major focus for developing food policy and have had to increase their traditional consultative role. The additional work generated in responding to and in influencing EU policy has also led to an increase in activity.
In this context a generalised concept of corporatism is not enough to permit the interpretation of retailer and state power in the 1990s; nor to begin to explain how the new power relations shape retailers' competitive space. Regulatory policies and the structures in which private interests are empowered involve making those interests legally coresponsible, or sometimes even completely responsible, for the formulation and implementation of state regulation. This happened most notably with the Food Safety Act 1990; and more recently with the passage of the Food Hygiene Directive 1995 by the Council of the European Communities (CEC, 1993); and it represents, according to Schmitter (1982) , the development of microcorporatist relations.
It may seem that, for instance, the Food Standards Committee (redefined in 1983 to be the Food Advisory Committee) represents an example of the state having ultimate responsibility for implementation and formulation, and that the involved interest groups have essentially an advisory role based on established consultation procedures. The various committees of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF)'s Food Safety Directorate, place increasing emphasis on enhancing consultation and advice, almost, as de Vroom (1986) admits, to the detriment (or possible 'stonewalling') of speedy implementation of EU policy. But it is not just to the regulation of food products that we should look. The involvement in the regulation of procedures and practices in the delivery of food-through local environmental-health and trading-standards officers-gives a fuller appreciation of new microcorporatist relations (Harrison et al, forthcoming) . Moreover, whereas in traditional terms there has been a reliance upon sectoral forms of corporatism (or mesocorporatism), which has involved multipartite responsibilities and reliance upon food-producer or food-processor sectors, (probably the best example in the British case is the dairy sector, see Grant, 1991) , we now begin to witness a shift towards more microrelations with particular firms and agencies which sometimes act cooperatively as business-interest associations, but on others as firms that operate alone on a one-to-one basis with government departments.
As recently as the mid-1980s, political scientists tended to regard corporatist relations as rather exceptional, even if they were particularly prevalent in the food sector. As Grant (1986) comments, for instance, "corporatist relations are the exception rather than the rule in Britain. There is a strong tradition of consultation with sectional interests, but it is unusual for the state to designate a particular organisation as the representative of a particular category of interest and to delegate powers to develop and implement public policy to a private government" (page 186). Yet, by the mid-1990s there has developed a model of more flexible (that is, less institutionally rigid and more contingent) microcorporatism whereby retailers individually and collectively share an increasing responsibility for the delivery of public policy. The broader shifts in the political economy of the nation-state, and the increasing 'consumer'-led transfer of power down the food chain to retailers (see also Doel, 1996; Marsden and Wrigley, 1996) have combined to empower retailers as harbingers of public policy through private and corporatist means. These new forms of corporatism are not simply a state-based expedient developed to devolve responsibility to those sectors most qualified to understand the complexity of the modern food system. As we shall argue below, they are also based on new and interesting combinations of economic and political power under conditions where consumption and food-quality issues, and particularly their articulation and representation, are central for the maintenance of both.
A central obstacle in recent regulatory development for the retailers and government alike has been the need to overcome some of the constraints which de Vroom (1986), through a very interesting comparative political analysis of European food processing conducted in the mid-1980s, suggested:
"Since quality regulation-from the point of view of business-is closely linked to competition, a collective interest in quality control may cause at the same time conflicting interests in the operationalisation of a quality control scheme .... Self regulation by business interest associations may, in other words, cause 'management of diversity problems'. Another problem of self regulation may be the lack of confidence of the public (of consumers) in the self control of the industry. One way to overcome these conflicting problems is state regulation" (page 205). Whereas the dominance of a state-centred model of regulation is often seen as necessary because of the potential lack of public confidence generated by self-regulation, retailers and the state have evolved working relationships which maintain public legitimacy and market power. This is achieved less through the establishment of new institutional structures as it is through the mutual agreement and constructions of what constitutes 'the consumer interest' in the provision of 'quality' goods and services. As a result, the general pressure for deregulation and abolition of corporatist structures (such as, for instance the Milk Marketing Boards in 1994) has not left a complete void in policymaking. That is, the state has not simply been 'hollowed out'. Rather, the political space has been reoccupied by new microcorporatist relations which stress the delivery of public policy through hybrid, corporate and state relationships and procedures.
The new regulatory relationships and models between government and retailers have to achieve more flexibility in creating 'Chinese walls' at certain times between government departments and retailers, and between the retailers themselves. At other times concerted actions are made collaboratively through government committees and retailer-representative organisations. It is this flexibility in the new forms of corporatism which allows private sector interests to have an influence both on the direction of policy formation and on implementation in the food-quality field specifically. Whereas the 'old' forms of producer and processor corporatism were largely based around a quantitatively oriented regulatory domain; that is, dealing with supply regulation in macroeconomic management terms (see Cox et al, 1988) , the newer phase is concerned with the legitimation problems of consumers rather than producers. As a result, issues of 'quality' rather than of quantitative supply become both more immediately significant and more pressing for the maintenance of retailers' competitive space. Moreover, because the corporate retailers are seen to be constantly dealing with 'consumers' they become sensitive barometers for government in the testing of what is seen to be legitimate policy. For this to be sustained there have to be both competitive (for the retailers) and legitimatory (for government) mutual benefits developed. One significant basis of this changing policy context concerns the different constructions of food quality and 'the consumer interest'. These are less and less hard-and-fast concepts in regulatory activity. Rather, they are continually contested and represented in the range of different regulatory domains which cut across the food-policy spectrum, and they provide a basis for a mutuality of purpose between government and retailers.
Constructing the consumer interest: consumer culture and regulatory culture
How can we effectively observe and assess the operation of these new corporatist power relations? What are the parameters upon which legitimacy and competitive spaces are maintained in microcorporatist relations?
In undertaking detailed interviews with government officials, retailers, and consumer organisations we have gathered both primary and secondary material with which we can begin to trace the architecture of this new regulatory phase. Significant shifts have been experienced by civil servants over recent years in terms of their priorities and practices. They have been encouraged to adopt more of what they term a sponsorship role with the food industry. As a senior official in the Department of Trade and Industry said, "It's not a simple world. It's not industry telling us to sweep away regulation and we do it. One of the things that we think is of great value with the task forces is to take the voice of business into the decisionmaking process. Not afterwards when the superb civil-servant-drafted consultation document is issued; with everyone given four weeks to comment and then essentially through the trade association, but rather, to bring business into the discussion at the point at which policy is being formulated. Again, it is not so much the removal of regulation, it's not so much the prevention of regulation, it's getting the regulation right ... let's ask people about the assumptions that we are making about the impact on industry." The regulatory culture developed in Whitehall holds sets of standing conditions which place the onus upon state officials to justify regulation in terms of the costs and benefits to retailers. This cost-compliance ideology serves to embed the development of public regulation into the dynamic and competitive market positions of the corporate retailers. Retailers need new forms of regulation concerning food quality, but they need this shaped around their own individual and collective needs. This process can then help to strengthen their competitive space over independent retailers and other corporate retailers.
One significant example of this has concerned the formulation of the EU Directive on the Hygiene of Foodstuffs (CEC, 1993) and its British implementation. The bigthree retailers in particular pressured hard, individually and collectively, to influence the adoption of HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points) systems in the Directive, and in the British codes of practice. They were proactive in feeding into government their own practices as part of a wider piece of legislation which would affect all food businesses in their delivery and supply of food quality. The outcome for the government was that a business-led piece of legislation had been developed which could 'streamline' existing provisions and place the responsibility for food quality further into the private sector sphere. This represented the adherence to the principles of the governments' wider programme of deregulation and corporate responsibility. At the same time it reinforced a private interest model of food-quality regulation initiated under the provisions of the Food Safety Act of 1990.
The combination of these regulatory changes allows government to redefine its role with respect to the corporate sector. From the perspective of government, the provisions of the Food Safety Act provide now only a 'backstop' regulatory framework within which the retail and food-manufacturing trade can operate. Consider the following quote from a MAFF official:
"The Food Safety Act is, of course, a consumer-protection measure. The whole purpose of what we do in conjunction with food is consumer protection. Consumer protection comes under two broad legs if you like. One is food safety-that foodstuffs that are processed and handled and put on the market or purchased by consumers are not going to make consumers ill or kill them. The second thing is to make sure that the consumer is not deceived. That it protects the consumer against deception .... That means deception both in misleading labelling, also, in making sure the product is properly described. And also that it is of a quality that it claims to have. We don't set the quality standards, but I mean, foodstuffs will claim qualities, properties, or the manufacturers or producers or whatever (eg functional foods). So it is these two broad areas. And why do we do it? Well first, the onus to produce safe food and to label food correctly and to make sure the consumer is not deceived-the onus is quite clearly on the trader. It's the trader's responsibility to be honest with his customers. He has a duty to his customers. What we do is provide a legal framework in which this can operate." Such a clear formal definition of private and public roles does not, however, tend to ameliorate the growing public consciousness associated with food issues. "It's become, very diverse. It has become very diverse. I mean it's part of public awareness you've got of issues, the more issues arise. And the more issues that you have to deal with. You don't always deal with them by finding a solution to them. You deal with some of them by saying you can't deal with them. Certainly happens that, and certainly since the scares of the late 1980s, there is greater awareness of food issues. Perhaps the food-safety issues, strict food-safety issues, microbiological issues if you like, have declined a little over the last two or three years. The nutrition issues are still there of course." The current regulatory culture in Whitehall encourages the adherence not only to cost-compliance principles, but also to the regulating last principle. This operated with the implementation of the "red meat" directive of 1991 (CEC, 1991) , which required the establishment of national standards of Meat Hygiene, and an enhanced role for MAFF's official Veterinary Service in monitoring local slaughterhouses. The MAFFbased Meat Hygiene Service came into operation in 1994 and was heralded as a more streamlined regulatory system, performing the role of removing 'older' forms of regulation. For the retailers' part, regulation not only has to be minimised and shaped in ways which codify their existing practices, but it is also preferable if the regulation comes after their own private regulatory systems are in place and have been seen to be successful. This is not so much regulating last, as regulating later; that is, once they can demonstrate an effective system of private regulation that can then be publicly sponsored by government.
The emerging regulatory culture We can see from this discussion that the regulatory culture that typifies state -retailer relations in the United Kingdom at the present time seriously questions our traditional and dichotomous notions of state-based or private-sector-based models. The timespecific webs of connection on a whole range of food-quality policy issues develop new hybrid forms of regulatory formation and practice. These are situated, and derive considerable potency from, a regulatory culture which assumes that the public interest is best served through private sector forms of regulation and government practices, and which depends upon private interests to originate the very content of new legislation.
This culture is very different from more conventional (mainland European) notions of corporatism where the expertise as well as economic power of particular 'insider' producer interests are relied upon to develop consensus policy formulation (see Just, 1994) . Here, specific firms situated at the consumer end of major food-supply chains can initiate policy formation in concert with a state administration which is looking to devolve responsibility and awards success to civil servants who can most effectively respond to the private sector demands. This regulatory culture can also seemingly, at least in some cases where the degree of subsidiarity can be maximised, absorb policy directives from Brussels and shape them in forms which appease private interests. Indeed, it may be that the retailers and government can see mutual benefits in lobbying Brussels at the policy-formation stage, given the success of the development and implementation of the Food Hygiene Directive. This raises some interesting questions concerning the representation of the British state (as well as citizen) at the supranational level.
The changing nature of the regulatory culture described here has also to be linked to the significance of consumer culture. Our evidence suggests that the regulatory systems now developing are not disassociated from the growth during the past decade of an individualised consumer culture, which has been partly shaped by the corporate retailers themselves (see Glennie and Thrift, 1996; Pred, 1996) . The 'reflexive turn' by consumers, and the individuation and identity politics involved in the consumption process (see Lury, 1996; Miller, 1995) , tend to reinforce the political power of corporate retailers in their ability to 'represent the consumer'. In interviews with government officials it was clear that the material fact that millions of people pass through the main retailers every day gave the corporate retailers an authority in Whitehall which far outweighed the representations of consumer organisations or public bodies. The retailers' pivotal position as consumer gateways, as social barometers, and particularly their considerable intelligence-gathering activities about consumers, becomes a powerful representational tool in their dealings with the state.
Emerging consumer-regulatory cultures There are, then, some important interactions between the evolving regulatory culture and the consumer culture. The retailers are committed, for their own survival, to promote the constant and dynamic individuation and segmentation of 'the consumer' through innovation and provision of new 'quality' choices. This is by no means always successful, and it has to be constantly constructed not least around increasingly subtle modifications of quality definitions (for example, 'novel' and 'functional' food developments). Consumers have to be encouraged to be progressive in their buying patterns, to try something new and to assess relative forms of food quality. In addition, they have to be captured and persuaded to become 'loyal'. These processes of constantly feeding particular types of individualised consumer culture not only stand to empower the corporate retailer in the local market place, they also bestow a growing socially and politically embedded custodial role on retailers which can, in turn, be used in policymaking circles. This increases the significance of consumption concerns in policymaking, and the role of retailers in representing-in increasingly sophisticated waysconsumers and consumer interest as 'the public interest'. For example, the reluctance of the main retailers to introduce irradiated food products and some recent genetically modified food materials, despite MAFF scientists' approval of such products, demonstrates the ways in which retailers are sensitised to consumer confidence and actions, and to the need to be seen as responsible custodians of individualised consumer culture. In order for these particular facets of consumer culture to be maintained, government and the retailers have to project them as socially progressive. The growing provision of 'food choice', and the elaboration of different degrees and definitions of quality, feed this progressive ideology both inside and outside government circles. In addition, they have the secondary effect of creating a widening gap between old-style baseline food-quality standards (still enforced where necessary by MAFF and the Department of Health), and newer, privately regulated, quality criteria which lie above absolute quality standards, supplying more choice and variety for the consumer. Retailers thus become seen as the harbingers of choice and quality. Nevertheless, these definitions need to be constantly replenished in order for the progressive element to be maintained.
Cascading quality? Sustaining difference and retail hierarchies Given the regulatory and consumer cultures which bestow upon retailers a custodial role in food provision, our interviews reveal how retailers differentially construct quality definitions and project these as legitimate and powerful knowledges in the intensely competitive market place. Government officials, although they may rely upon the scientific evidence and adjudications of their committees (for example, the Food Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Novel Foods and Processes), realise that it is up to the retailers to decide what to sell and how to sell it. Government regulations relating to food safety and quality are seen as broad parameters within which the corporate sector can reshape in-as we see below-a hierarchical fashion.
The big-three retailers are seen both by government officials and by lower-tier retailers as setting the pace on food quality and delivery. As one of them commented: "Well our profile, I suppose, would be A, B, C, and C2s, we have to show, I suppose towards the higher end of the market. You can't be a mass-market retailer without being, you know, having a very widespread of consumers. But you do try. I think within our business we would say that we are more biased towards the upper end of the demographic scale than anywhere else."
"Well I was going to mention when we talked about innovation-that we are continually benchmarking ourselves against the best of the market-and we use the word 'quality-value'. If you take an area that I am familiar with-mangoes for instance-we would import mangoes five years ago and they may not have tasted very good. Well the objective is now that we want very good flavoured mangoes, which are already ripened and ready for the customer to eat on the shelf. And that would be a measured quality parameter. And there would be a specification for every product. Then we would have had a quality audit, whereby we would say 'is this still the best?'" Through the innovation of over 1000 new products each year and in conducting over 2500 panels with consumers, the construction of quality is a major aspect of the dynamism of the corporate retail firm. As he continues:
"We debate it at length. Then we ask customers to define what they think is quality-they find it very difficult. When we talk about quality of a product, we normally talk about its eating qualities. When we ask customers what they think about quality and they spend two hours-and quality to them means the atmosphere of the store, the quality of the trolleys, the quality of their experience when they go in; as well as the quality at the end of the day of their products, and how they eat when they take them home. And all that is wrapped up in what they believe to be quality of their product. So it's impossible to identify one aspect of quality, or to say quality is only when you put it in the oven, and take it out and eat it. Because, before you've got to that stage, all the other things have impacted on it. It does make a big difference if they have had a particularly pleasurable experience when they bought the product, then the quality of that product may not suffer as a result. Not because of the actual quality of the ingredients or how it performs." Such composite definitions of quality relations between retailers and customers are seen to be different among the lower tiers of retailing. The discounters are seen as offering a modified quality -price relationship to their customers:
"They offer something different. They offer competitive prices on certain lines that people may be prepared to sacrifice quality to get price for .... So if you're buying something like sugar, or skimmed milk powder, or tin foil you may not expect or may not want quality of that product to perform to a certain level. So you may be willing to sacrifice quality for price. And if they can buy something which they believe gives them acceptable quality and a very competitive price then they may be prepared to go to ALDI, Netto, or Kwiksave to purchase it." For the market leaders:
"The two principal areas for us are product development and own label. These are the two main drivers .... People shop with us because it is a bigger experience than all the things we have talked about. It's about confidence that we have got control of the products we sell. Our own-label products that we have put a lot of work into, protecting the consumer and food safety. And a lot of research has been done in terms of the way people perceive messages. There's a fairly high level of confidence. That if we say something about our products, then obviously we really do believe in them."
"But it you take examples like pesticides: we've done a communication there as a quiet revolution, about pesticide reduction. That is a communication direct to our customers, in easy-to-read format, saying that there are other ways of controlling pests and diseases in crops, instead of putting chemicals on them. When we do put chemicals on them, then obviously we follow the legislation. We test to make sure they are at the right levels."
"And it's got to be said, I think, as a company we are much more, I mean we are ahead, in terms of being proactive, on these issues. Like animal welfare-a topical issue at the moment-where we have been working for many years ahead of what's happening now with our 'partnership in livestock' scheme .... With our farmers, developing a positive approach to better animal welfare. But a lot of these things take a lot of time to actually implement. So it's a slow process of encouraging people and getting them to go in the right direction." For the second and third tiers of retailers a less composite and proactive set of issues come to dominate. This is illustrated by the following quotation:
"The critical issue is what sells. I mean we are in a repeat market. Our customers visit us week by week. Our benchmark of quality is the grounds that we have built up over the years. We will technically specify individual standards for particular products, but that is not against some sort of abstract quality definition. I mean the thing that we try and do is to express our aims in Daily Mirror language because that is what our customers like. We aim to keep the business as simple as possible. What we are in the business of doing is providing a mix of food prices which is what our customers want. We land up with very competitive-priced wholesome food, so normally, the best way of working out whether the quality is right is by putting it out on the shelves, and see what happens. I mean this is what 'Marks and Spencer' do, they are far and away the best people in the market in terms of new food products. They put them straight on the shelves. They are very intolerant of the things that aren't selling." "In the first place, the own brand came in when the business was trying to become a pale imitation of Sainsbury's, so you have got from a standing start a huge amount of products coming in at a rate of knots. A lot of products went out of variable quality. What we have done in the last two years is to reexamine every single product. We have put them through a detailed analysis and consumer testing, and when we were not happy with the product, we cleared them out. We got to a smaller hard core of product that we were comfortable with where people were very happy with the quality of our product. We were then able to put discount on our flagship brands .... The objective therefore is acceptable quality at outstanding price. This is obviously helping us to protect our underbelly against the discounters. So there is no advantage to go to the discounters. You look at our price-our own pricing-our own label, and our Farm stores range, and there is no reason to go to a discounter unless there is one just around the corner." For these second-tier retailers quality is anchored much more strictly to price and a 'paying for what you get' justification in serving the customer. These conceptions of quality are linked to particular constructions of who their customers are; and perceived notions of how 'their' customers differ from those of the big three, the discounters, or the independents. Food quality and the consumer are socially graded. For the discounters the challenge is to make significant inroads into the richer consumer markets: "I think it has changed just in the four years that we have been operating in this country. We started with the poorest part of the population and now we're moving up and a so-called better class of customers will now shop here. All the discounters will now because people are finding out it's the same product at the end of the day, so why pay more? And the difference that they save might as well go and spend in Sainsbury's on some more wine or whatever." "I think, in general, our pricing philosophy is simply to be sold well priced, low priced. So if people have an interest in saving money they will find products that they don't like as much as others and they will say 'these cornflakes are not as good as Kellogg's'; or T don't like them for some reason'. Because we have letters in when we change products-and people write in and say 'oh the cornflakes must have changed because they are not as good as they were before!' Any new line has to go through a tasting panel, of which I'm one of the members. We taste everythingagainst the brands, against the greater multiples' own labels-and so, if it's all gone through a tasting panel-we reject a lot during tasting sessions." As another-second tier-retailer attempting to claim the high-street territory claims:
"Your grandmother is our customer .... They come in because they want a chat. They come in the same time each day, because they know their friends will be there.
We see ourselves as creating and strengthening that niche which says 'the High Street frequent shop', and this is the place to come for that. So there is a strong fresh points participation because fresh foods are the sort of thing that you want to buy more regularly. We are catering for a greater sense of impulse buying, because you have people coming in probably four or five times a week."
"In terms of food quality, first of all every single supermarket chain will establish its own benchmark, and that will vary. You will get a different benchmark by talking to Kwiksave than you would talking to us. Our benchmark is saying that, on our own label, we have to have a product that is among the top three in the field. In terms of product development, we tend to be a follower rather than a leader, given the nature of the business .... We will say that we want to be at least as good as the best three. So, our buyers will get samples, and food developers will test them, and they will dissect them and they will create a specimen. Sometimes we will go to the same supplier, and what we aim to do is to get the product that eats and tastes like the best of them." The evidence presented here demonstrates how, having been bestowed the rights by government to provide and define food-quality provision, the different tiers of retailing utilise these rights in different competitive ways. The corporate retailers have to translate the opportunities presented to them by microcorporatist relations with government in ways which enable them to maintain their own types of competitive space. A major element of retailer strategy is, therefore, both at national and at local levels, to project differentiated and hierarchical notions of food quality so as to at least maintain if not develop their spatial, intrasectoral, and supply-based dimensions of competitive space. The establishment of microcorporatist relations and the related emergence of regulatory and consumer cultures allows the creation of these competitive spaces. They involve corporate retailers in increasingly diverse sets of relationships not only with their consumers, but also with their competitors and government. In addition, and as the evidence above suggests, this requires constant forms of innovation in the provision of food and of food choices. In this regard the top tier of retailers have the most multidimensional conceptions of food quality, and are prepared to invest substantial resources in gauging and continually market testing their products.
These quality hierarchies may be seen as the ultimate celebration of deregulated capitalism and as capable of reinforcing a 'cascading' or 'trickle-down' concept of the provision of quality choices in a liberal democracy. Alternatively, and thus far there has been insufficient research conducted on this, we can see a significant 'degree of fit' between the hierarchical competition of retailers and socioeconomic categorisations and class conceptions. At the very least the active and dynamic parameters of differentiated retail competitive space outlined in this paper suggest a profound social significance in their influence in restructuring consumption and class recomposition.
Conclusion: towards a cultural political economy
In the latter part of the paper we have begun to demonstrate how contested and differentiated notions, concepts, and regulations surrounding food quality become a major organising concept around which retailers seek to influence food supply and consumption. As some of the social economists have explored more generally (see Allaire and Boyer, 1995; Granovetter, 1992) , the constructions and representations of quality become a key axis for structuring competition and locating firms at particular sites in these competitive terrains. These are, in a food-retailing context, not just important within 'the firm'. They provide a significant vehicle of communication and authority between retail firms and in the wider market and regulatory ensemble.
The competitive spaces occupied, as we outlined in the first part of the paper, are sustained by constructing and articulating conceptions of the consumer and food quality towards both the public on the one hand, and government officials and agencies on the other. In Britain at least, the uneven development of corporate retailing is assisted both by socially constructed but differentiated notions of food quality and by their use and articulation in systems of microcorporatist policymaking.
In terms of policy, therefore, the conflation of a national regulatory culture with a particularly dominant individualised, and differentiated form of consumer culture becomes an important basis for maintaining and developing the microcorporatist systems of policymaking in the British food sector. It is on the basis of these that knowledge, authority, and power in the retail sector are maintained and developed; and, more specifically, the relative competitive space of retailers structured. For social science scholars an exploration of these issues starts to demonstrate how aspects of culture and polity link together to provide the ground rules for capital accumulation and structuring the 'situations of exchange' (Appadurai, 1986) in the retail sector.
In this sense, we need to view the notion of cultural political economy as something more than a contradiction in terms. Changes in regulatory and consumer culture do not occur coincidentally. For corporate retailers and for government it becomes increasingly important in sustaining the vibrancy of neoright policy as well as the corporate power of retailers. We need to develop comparative analyses of how variations in these cultural and regulatory conditions influence the uneven development of retailing in different nation-states. At the very least this sort of analysis (linking the cultural with the political economic) casts severe doubt about uniform patterns of retail development. It suggests that the international and regional configuration of retailing will depend on how successful retailing can be in shaping political and regulatory systems-not least in projecting conceptions of quality provision-embedded as they are in different cultural and social conditions. Will the British 'big capital' highly concentrated retail model diffuse and transpose itself elsewhere? Or will the pattern of uneven development of retailing increasingly reflect the cultural political economy of the nation-state?
